Abstract
Introduction
Sri Lanka is a multi-religious, multi-ethnic and multi-lingual society. The pluralist make up of this country was built over a thousand years. Islam/Muslims and Buddhism/Sinhalese have coexisted in the island for at least since the 8 th century CE. For nearly one thousand years this coexistence was nothing but harmonious -a nonpareil record in the annals of Asian history. The rise of political Buddhism in the guise of Sinhalese-Buddhist national consciousness during the 1880s disrupted that harmony in 1915. After independence in 1948 however, lessons learnt from 1915, imperatives of electoral democratic politics, and ethnic tensions between the Sinhalese and Tamils necessitated an alliance of convenience between the Muslims and the Sinhalese. That alliance too became tenuous in and after the 1970s. While the return of an open market economy in 1977 intensified economic competition amongst different ethnic groups, the military victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 2009 produced an aura of triumphalism amongst the Sinhalese-Buddhists who, with support from militant elements of the Sangha, have become extremely aggressive and hegemonic. On the Muslim side, a wave of ultrareligious orthodoxy propagated by the evangelical Tabigh Jamaat (TJ) from the early 1960s and Saudi-backed Wahhabism from the 1980s has injected an ideology of universal umma-consciousness and a trend of social 'exclusivism' among many of their followers which runs directly in contrast to the indigenization and integration trajectories of the past. The political implications of this 'exclusivism' in a society grappling with competing ethnonationalisms have so far escaped the attention of scholars.
Political Buddhism with its current militant offshoot is the 'New Buddhism' and the product of a Sinhalese-Buddhist consciousness that developed during the British colonial era. It is structured upon an artificially manufactured "mythohistory" (Thambiah S.J, 1986) and questionable archaeology and cemented with an assumed sense of Sinhalese racial superiority (Jayawardena K, 1986; Bartholomeusz, T.J. and de Silva C.R, 1998; Somasundaram D, 2010) . This, in other words, is the Sri Lankan version of the 'political abuse of history' referred to by Romila Thapar in the context of Hindutva in India (Panikkar K.N, 2012) . Like political Islam in the Middle East and in other parts of the Muslim world, political Buddhism in Sri Lanka depends on an ideology based on "a set of systematically fashioned beliefs and symbols of Sinhala Buddhists" (Jayawardena K, 1986, p. 137) with its ultimate objective of converting Sri Lanka into a Sinhala-Dharmadvipa, in which all non-Sinhalese and nonBuddhists would become the distant "other". No wonder that one of the former presidents of the country is reported to have called the minorities "creepers" (Murari 2012, p.144 ). This hegemonic ideology, which once existed only in the thought-domain of the articulated and politically motivated Buddhist elite, has now, since the end of the civil war and through vigorous political and religious propaganda, permeated the edifice of the broad Sinhalese-Buddhist society -a foretoken to future political and social instability.
On the other hand, orthodox Islam, based on a "literalist-exclusivist" (Safi O, 2003) discourse of its primary sources namely, the Quran and the sunnah (sayings and practices of Prophet Muhammad), and indoctrinated by local and imported religious functionaries through a multiplicity of Islamic institutions, has injected, particularly after the 1970s, a strong umma-consciousness, which conceals within this imagined monolithic religious identity the ethnic diversity of the Muslim communit -a move, as one historian argues, "from vague initiations of identity and difference to pride in collective membership" (Wickremasinghe N, 2006, p.x) . The inner dynamics of this ummaconsciousness, with its ritual-oriented religious conservatism has become problematic in the face of an ideologically constructed Sinhalese-Buddhist consciousness. The open-economy within which these two phenomena operate has made Sinhalese-Muslim relations in Sri Lanka even more volatile with international implications. What follows is a historical but critical review of the ethno-religious and economic complexity that governs Sinhalese-Muslim relations in Sri Lanka.
A Millennium of Buddhist-Muslim Harmony
The history of Islam and Muslims in Sri Lanka dates back, according to one local Muslim scholar, to seventh century CE (Shukri, 1990, p.203) . It was neither conquest nor conversion but commerce and curiosity that brought the early Muslims to the shores of Sarandib, a name bestowed by the Arabs of yore upon this fertile island. While an abundance of forest resources, precious stones, and spices lured the commercial instincts of Arab and Persian traders, the curiosity of sufis or Muslim ascetics and Arab travellers drove them to visit Samanalakanda (butterfly-mountain) or popularly known as Adam's Peak in the central highlands where the legendary footprint of Adam, the father of humanity, according to Muslim believers, is found. The local Buddhist community and their rulers always welcomed these foreigners and allowed them, for economic and political reasons, to settle permanently in their territory. The Muslims fulfilled the need for a merchant class that was in short supply in the largely agricultural economies of the ancient and medieval Buddhist kingdoms. "They were a dominant influence", writes K. M. de Silva, an eminent historian of Sri Lanka, "on the island's international trade in the period of the Polonnaruva kings, a position which they retained till the early decades of the sixteenth century ..." (de Silva, 1981, p. 72) . With Muslims came Islam and the Buddhist rulers allowed the newcomers to practice their religion as long as it did not hurt the "religious susceptibilities of the majority of the people among whom they lived" (Paranavitana. S, 1959-60, p. 769 As years rolled, Muslim settlements increased in number and from the coastal areas they moved to the interior. The Arab Muslims, at times, as in 1238 under the reign of Bhuvanekabahu I, were even admitted to the foreign diplomatic missions of Buddhist kings. They became an invaluable asset to the local monarchs, economically as well as politically, and in establishing international contacts particularly with the Islamic Caliphate. In the words of Lorna Dewaraja, another reputed historian of the country, "... a group of itinerant traders, initially foreign in race, religion and culture became an indispensable and integral part of the Sri Lankan society" (Dewaraja, 1994, p.3) . Over the years and "as a result of intermarriage between them and the local population, they became Indo-Arab in 'ethnic' character rather than purely Arab" (de Silva, 1981, p. 91) . The erosion of their Arab ethnicity however did not lead to a dilution of their Islamic identity.
Until the arrival of the Portuguese in the 16 th century followed by the Dutch in the 17 th , Muslims in Sri Lanka virtually had no enemies. After comparing their status and position with their counterparts in Thailand, Burma, and China, Dewaraja finds in Sri Lanka, "a state of peaceful co-existence, unique in an era of religious persecution and rivalry ..." (Dewaraja, 1994, p. 14 There were two notable developments in the 19 th century as far as the Moors were concerned. One was an increase in the arrival of Muslim traders and businessmen from the Indian sub-continent who were officially called Coast Moors because of their coastal origins in today's Tamil Nadu, even though not all the Indians came from that part. Their entry into Sri Lanka which was largely curtailed if not totally prohibited by the Portuguese and Dutch was now made easier in the wake of loosening immigration restrictions by the British. The growing demands of a plantation economy for wholesale and retail services made their arrival timely and profitable. By the end of the 1800s the number of Coast Moors, according to census reports, increased from 27,000 in 1801 to 33,000 in 1911, which was 11 and 12 percent of the total Moor population respectively. The second development was a radical transformation of the official image of the Moors from negative to positive. Unlike the Portuguese and Dutch who were totally inimical towards Islam and negative about the Moors, the British on the contrary developed a positive image of this community because of the latter's hereditary commercial traits which the British realised could be harnessed and utilised to the benefit of an evolving commercial capitalism. In the official reports and publications for instance, while the Moors were popularly portrayed as enterprising, active, hardworking, dynamic, and business minded, the Buddhist Sinhalese in contrast were pictured as slovenly, indolent, and unenterprising ( Ali, 1987) . Needless to say, that this subtle exercise in differentiated ethnic imagery was another dimension of the colonial policy of divide and rule.
Simultaneously, within the majority Sinhalese community a different image about the Moors gained notoriety in the 19 th century, thanks mostly to the economic behaviour and religious practices of the recently arrived Coast Moors. The opening of Sri Lanka's interior through a net work of roads and railways, the development of Colombo as the administrative and commercial capital, and mushrooming of towns and markets in various parts of the island created multiple profit-making opportunities for investors, businessmen and entrepreneurs. To the traditional Moor businessmen these opportunities signalled a boon. Muslim settlements moved closer to the cities and towns and sections of their residences operated as shops and store-houses. The ubiquity of Muslim peddlers, Muslim tavalam-men (traders who went in convoys of pack oxen) and retail shopkeepers in the Sinhalese villages, and the presence of Muslim wholesalers in Colombo, stamped the Muslims as a business community, which characterization, in spite of its factual inaccuracy, is still held as heavenly truth by numerous Sri Lankan scholars, journalists, and politicians (Ali, 1980) .
In the meantime and towards the end of the 19 th century the profit-maximizing behaviour of the Coast Moors who were mostly 'birds of passage' and whose business establishments penetrated deep into the rural regions added to the economic hardship of many Sinhalese villagers, whose economic survival had already become precarious because of the unfair competition for natural and human resources stemmed from a state sponsored plantation sector. "The Mohamedan traders, who come from South-India and return thither when they have money by retail trading", wrote Sir Robert Chalmers, the .. and the result is that Mohammedan thrives and the son of soil goes to the wall" (Ibid). Even though Dharmapala later denied that he ever advocated hatred against the Mohammedans but held them as exemplars of "energy, industry, perseverance, usefulness, (and) cleanliness" in contrast to "the indolent, ignorant, (and) illiterate Sinhalese villager" (op.cit., p.721), he nevertheless warned that "there will always be bad blood between the Moors and the Sinhalese" (op.cit., p. 541). The anti-Muslim sentiments expressed by him and his co-agitators like Walisinghe Harischandra and Piyadasa Sirisena, and which were popularised through Sirisena's paper Sinhala Jatiya had taken a life of its own in making the Muslims the "far other'. When the riots started in 1915 the distinction between the Coast Moor and the Ceylon Moor began to fade away (Wickremasinghe N, 2006, p.120) . As a result, a total of 25 Muslims were murdered, 189 were injured, 350 houses and 17 mosques were set ablaze, and another 50 mosques suffered some sort of structural damage (Ali, 1981) . Even though the riots were "a reflection of economic dislocation, price rises and the political ferment of the period" (Jayawardena K, op.cit., p.136) it is undeniable that a politicised and popularised Buddhist consciousness rallied the Buddhist masses and set them against the Muslims. "The Tambies", a colloquial reference to the Muslims, "are insulting our nationality and our religion. We must harass the Tambies, and they must be driven out of Ceylon" was the call of the Buddhist agitators (Quoted in Wickramasinghe N, op.cit., p. 119).
Political Buddhism after Independence
Political Buddhism and Sinhalese-Buddhist consciousness, which in the early decades of the 20 th century acted only as an enabler of national anti-colonial and pro-independence struggle grew into a movement of ethno-nationalist Buddhist ideology and played a decisive role in competitive party politics of post-independent Sri Lanka (Somasundaram, 2010) . In this toxic mix of ethnicity, religion and politics the involvement of the Sangha in politics received institutional blessing from the Declaration of the Vidyalankara Privena in February 1946. This declaration, which was triggered by a public speech made a month earlier by a left-lenient scholar-monk, Walpola Rahula, in response to a criticism by the first future Prime Minister of the country, D.S. Senanayake, who attacked such monks for appearing on the campaign platforms of Trotskyites and Communists, could be viewed as a fatwa from the Sangha sanctifying active participation of Buddhist monks in politics. The declaration that was drafted by another scholar-monk, Yakkaduwa Sri Pragnarama Nayaka Thera, and was approved by the Board of teachers of the Privena included the following paragraph in the final document:
We believe that politics have embraced all fields of human activity directed towards the public weal. No one will dispute that the work of the promotion of the religion is the duty of the Bhikkhus. It is clear that the welfare of the religion depends on the welfare of the people who profess that religion. History bears evidence to the fact that whenever the Sinhalese nation which was essentially a Buddhist nation was prosperous, Buddhism also flourished. We therefore declare that it is 1948) . He was more specific in his allegation when he delivered another speech later that year. "The Ceylon Moors" he said, "had a flourishing trade in main street Pettah barely 40 years ago; but today you find the whole of the trade in Pettah, in the hands of non-Ceylon traders" (Hansard, 1948 ). Razik's ethnic parochialism also set the tone for future parliamentary strategy of Muslim leaders in navigating through the confrontational Sinhalese-Tamil ethno-nationalisms.
With ethnic politics driving a wedge between the Sinhalese and Tamil communities from the 1950s Muslim leaders showed "gradual acceptance of a polity dominated by the Sinhalese and a reluctance to be assimilated within the larger Tamil-speaking community" (Wickremasinghe N, 2006, p. 145) . This strategy was later translated almost into an electioneering slogan by another prominent Muslim leader when he said, "divided they are, we swim; united they are, we sink". Sometimes described as pragmatic politics this strategy undoubtedly yielded several benefits to the Muslim community. The years from 1950s to the 1970s could be described as the honeymoon period of Muslim-Sinhalese relationship in independent Sri Lanka. Politically the community's parliamentary representation, except in 1970, never failed to keep pace with its population strength. Even in electorates where the Sinhalese were in majority, like Galagedera and Akurana, a Muslim was able to win a parliamentary seat because of Sinhalese support. Practically in every ministerial cabinet Muslims were represented. Educationally, Government Muslim Schools were opened in all provinces which operated on a religiously determined school calendar different from the national school calendar. These schools were staffed by Muslim teachers most of whom were trained in exclusive Muslim Teachers Training Colleges. These schools are supervised by Muslim Inspectors and administered by a Muslim Director of Education. Culturally, Islamic holy days were declared public holidays; Muslims were allocated exclusive hours to broadcast Islamic programs over Radio Ceylon; Muslim public servants were allowed to take extended lunch-breaks on Fridays to attend Jumm'a prayers; a Wakf Board was established to manage all the mosques in the island; and Kazi religious courts were created for Muslims to deal with Muslim marriage and divorce issues on the basis of shariah laws. Economically also, at least until a Socialist Government came to power in 1970, the open economy allowed Muslim businessmen to thrive without much restraint (Ali, 1986 , O'Sullivan, 1997 . The fact that all this were achieved by Muslims without a political party of their own and that it was the ethnic rivalry between the Sinhalese and Tamils that made these achievements easier to get were factors that the current Muslim leadership fails to understand and acknowledge.
This strategy of aligning with the ruling governments to harvest transient benefits did not change even after forming in 1985 the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), an ethnic Muslim political party "pledged to follow the Quran and the Sunnah" (Imtiyaz, 2012 .J. Wilson, 1975, p.175) . "The landslide victory of the U.N.P and the constitutional changes that followed should therefore be viewed as steps intended to free the U.N.P and even the S.L.F.P in future from any dependence on minority support" (Ali, 1986) . It was the new constitution with its scheme of proportional representation that paved the way for some Muslims to form a political party of their own, the SLMC.
In the general elections of 1993 when the SLFP won with a slender majority SLMC's support became crucial to form a government. The election results demonstrated clearly the failure of Jayewardena's objective of marginalising Muslim influence. The leader of the SLMC, Ashraff, publicly trumpeted, with an element of truth, that it was he and his party that was responsible for the formation of the Chandrika Kumaratunga Government. This flamboyant braggadocio inflamed anti-Muslim feelings among the Sinhalese, which was further aggravated in 1999 when Ahraff challenged and engaged in a television debate with Gangodawila Somarama Thera, who considered the Muslims a threat to Sri Lanka. Although the debate was a "setback for the popular Buddhist monk" (Dewasiri, 2012) it deepened the bitterness of some sections of Buddhists towards Muslims. In 2001, a major clash broke out in Mawanella, a town along the Colombo-Kandy Road, which spread to its suburban villages causing considerable losses to Muslim lives and property. At least one mosque was incinerated in this episode (Anas et al, 2008) . All in all, between the 1970s and until 2002, nearly 30 violent Muslim-Sinhalese clashes have been recorded and in a number of them Buddhist monks had played a leading role (M. S. M. Anas et al, 2008) . Sporadic violence continued to occur thereafter and the anti-Muslim rally in Dambulla in April 2012, which was "meticulously planned" (Hussain, 2012) and operated by radical monks who demanded the closure of a mosque in that town, was one of the more recent of such incidents. With 'Sinhalese Only' as the official language and Buddhism as religion with special status, the Tamils saw the writings on the wall that their language and culture being demoted constitutionally. They took up the fight to redress this imbalance, which ultimately led them to demand a separate state, culminating in a civil war that ended in military defeat. The Muslim community on the other hand, as observed earlier, did not have anything to do with the Tamil struggle and continued to align themselves with the Sinhalese majority. One of the reasons for this nonchalance, apart from politics of pragmatism, was the switch from the 'racial' Moor identity to the religious Muslim identity after the 1970s. This new identity which was chosen as a convenient tool to demonstrate Muslim neutrality in the raging Sinhalese-Tamil armed confrontation promoted the growth of religious consciousness within the community and made umma Islamiyya or Islamic community and not the nation of Sri Lanka the primary entity of allegiance. The periodic switch of identity by the Muslim elite from Moor to Ceylon Moor and to Muslim reinforces Ismail's argument that identities are "fluid, transient, always in flux, never permanent; and ... they alter ... precisely because they are constructs" (Ismail Q 1995, italics in the original). However, unlike his claim that the switch is always made in the interest of the elite, the one from Ceylon Moor to Muslim was made at the grass root level rather than at the elite level owing to the evangelical endeavour of Muslim missionary movements as will be shown below.
The concept of umma Islamiyya refers to the collectivity of believers in Islam of all nations who consider the Islamic shariah as the guiding principle and philosophy of any political entity. This universal religious community which exists more in the believers' imagination than in reality is found spread within three regions as delineated by Muslim relations rarely faced any tension on religious grounds, even though it was a Buddhist religious procession that provided the immediate trigger for the 1915 riots; but that is now a distant memory. However, certain developments in the last three or four decades as pointed out earlier have created once again an environment of tension between the two communities. A fresh wave of ultra-Islamic orthodoxy appears to be in clash with political Buddhism and its minority militant offshoot. Before exploring Munk's contention further some aspects of this orthodoxy and its growth in Sri Lanka need addressing.
The open economy of the 1980s in Sri Lanka ushered in at a time when a new wave of Islamic awakening was sweeping across the Muslim Middle East. The emergence of the Organization of the Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) as price setter of petroleum, which flooded the coffers of the OAPEC (Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries) nations with countless amount of petro-dollars; the success of the Iranian "Islamicized" ( Dabashi H, 2012: 40) revolution in 1979 which, although was a shia minority phenomenon, yet, sent a strong message to the sunni majority that worldwide Islamic rule was not far away; and, the successful participation of Al-Qaida and the Mujahideen in the American led war against Soviet forces in Afghanistan: all these developments culminated in an umma-wide Islamic euphoria that the world had never witnessed before. (Lebbe, 1980) .
Another material benefit enjoyed especially by the Muslims had a spiritual side to it. The local Muslim community became a favoured beneficiary of Arab charity from the 1980s. While Sri Lankan products like tea and precious stones found a ready market in Muslim Middle East, which increased the country's national income (close to 50 percent of Sri Lankan tea goes even now to Muslim countries), Arab public and private charity flowed back into the Muslim community in the form of financial assistance to build mosques, madrasas, and other Muslim religious and cultural institutions. Even local Muslims employed in the Middle East donated generously to those projects. Muslims, in general, have a penchant towards building mosques and the imams never stopped stressing in their sermons the heavenly reward waiting for those who build a 'House for Allah' in this world. As a result of external assistance and internal collections new mosques were built and old ones were renovated and enlarged, and according to the Sri Lankan Wakf Board website there are at least 1,816 mosques of varying sizes in the country. The actual number should be more than that because not all mosques are registered with the Wakf Board. In recent years however, a number of these mosques and madrasas have become a source of Buddhist-Muslim tension.
Unlike the Buddhist vihares, Christian churches and Hindu temples, Muslim mosques have to be internally spacious to accommodate hundreds of worshippers every day. Also, unlike in other religions, praying five times a day is obligatory to all Muslims. Praying in congregation, preferably in a mosque led by an imam, is taught to be more meritorious than praying in isolation at one's home or elsewhere. On Friday noon every week, for thirty nights during the fasting month of Ramadhan, and in the mornings of the two festival days, the congregation of worshippers would swell to thousands. In the early days of Islam the mosque operated not only as a place of worship but also as a centre of learning and communal assemblies. It continues to perform these functions even now. This means the mosque premise is an intensely utilised spot and is never left un-attended. The Prophet of Islam innovated a unique way of reminding Muslims about prayer times, by vocally calling them through a specific recitation in Arabic, the adhan. This recitation continues unaltered to this day and could be heard at least five times a day wherever Muslims live. Tradition has made it meritorious for Muslims to live close to a mosque so that they could hear the voice of adhan. However, in plural societies like Sri Lanka where people of different faiths and of philosophical persuasion live as neighbours, and with increased urbanization and noise pollution, this voice is not always audible unless a loudspeaker is used. It is the use of this piece of technology especially for the pre-dawn prayer that has caused problem. That particular adhan disturbed everyone's sleep. Some aggressive Buddhists reacted to this disturbance in a tit-for-tat manner by playing over loudspeakers, even before the Muslim pre-dawn prayer time, taped versions of Buddhist chanting. The issue over this cacophony of competing religious noises went before the Supreme Court which delivered its verdict on 9 November 2007 disallowing the use of loudspeakers that caused "annoyance, disturbance, and harm" to other parties (CIMOGG, 2007) .
Construction of mosques without approval from the state or its local governing authorities and without conforming to the national architectural environment of the country is a burning issue in most Western countries. Behind this issue is the fundamental fear of several European countries about Muslim "political will to take power" and establish Shariah law (New York Times, 2009). The controversy over the minarets in Switzerland is well known and even in Australia the Department of Town Planning is quite scrupulous in approving applications for building mosques. In Sri Lanka the Muslims never threatened to take control of political power nor are they craving for the implementation of Shariah law on a national scale. However, to the Sinhala-Buddhist political monks and their followers, who view Sri Lanka as the land of dhammadipa or the land of the righteous, the mosques, churches, and even Hindu temples have become icons of the unrighteous. It is this religiously manufactured fear that has led to protests against mosques and madrasas.
The Muslim code of dress has also become controversial in recent decades. The traditional sarong, shirt, jacket, and Fez cap for males, and sari, blouse, and mukkadu (the top piece of the sari thrown over the head) for females, are gradually being replaced with a mixture of north-Indian or Pakistani and Arabian attire for both men and women. The long black gown with a black niqab or veil that covers the face with a small opening for the eyes is entirely a recent introduction into the sartorial designs of Muslim women in Sri Lanka. I have already dealt with the historical genesis and religious aspects of burqa and niqab in another context (Ali, 2010a) .
The mushrooming of mosques and madrasas, the call for prayer over loudspeakers, and the changing Muslim attire are all related to a rising brand of Islamic orthodoxy after the 1970s. There are two Islamic movements in Sri Lanka that have promoted this orthodoxy. One is the Tabligh Jamaat (TJ) whose origins go back to pre-independence India. It is a missionary movement whose chief objective is Islamization of Muslims rather than converting nonMuslims to Islam (Ali, A. 2006) . Indian missionaries of TJ frequented Sri Lanka from the 1950s and today the number of its local foot-soldiers has grown to hundreds of thousands. TJ is a non-aggressive and moderate religious movement that shuns any political involvement or affiliation. In fact, it preaches minimum attachment to the affairs of this world and maximum devotion to matters of the Hereafter. Its disinterestedness in more mundane and national issues is a concern to all governments. As Ziauddin Sardar, a prolific writer on Muslim affairs, found out from his experience with TJ, they "neither offered nor considered they had to do anything particular about rampant injustice, the horrors of suffering and neglect that formed the circumstances and deformed so many lives in country after country, the Muslim world especially" (Sardar Z, 2004, p. 12 Yusuf al-Qaradawi (Qaradawi, 2001 ) is currently in its nascent stage and yet to provide a blueprint in these matters to Muslim minorities living all over the world.
In many parts of the world where Muslims live as minorities they live in "parallel societies" as argued by Tibi (2008) . The Muslim preference to build parallel societies is perhaps the legacy of the Convivencia model that prevailed in Muslim Spain where each ethnic or religious community was allowed to live in virtual exclusion governed by its own religious laws (Ali 2010b) . In Sri Lanka also this exclusivist trend is noticeable. Imtiyaz's contention that Islamic fundamentalism in Sri Lanka is a "by-product of state's cultural and socioeconomic concessions in the 70s and 80s to the Muslim elites to win Muslim support" and "provided a solid platform for the recent growth of Islamic exclusivism" provides a convenient platform (Imtiyaz ARM, op.cit.) Be that as it may, this fundamental contradiction between the goals of political Buddhism and Islamic fundamentalism is currently being exploited by an openeconomy-generated Sinhalese-Buddhist bourgeoisie to gain economic mileage over the Muslim businessmen; and it is this toxic mix that lies at the heart of recent Sinhalese-Muslim disturbances. An open economy always creates inequities if not regulated; but that regulation must be rational in objective and neutral in implementation. The current political regime in Sri Lanka with its alliance with JHU and ultra-nationalists does not seem to have either the capacity or willingness to tackle this issue.
With the Tamil ethnic problem still remaining unresolved, more than three years after the end of the civil war, opening a second front to fight the Muslim community will only impact the country's international image even more negatively. When the Dambulla mosque incident took place in April 2012 the Muslims of Tamil Nadu went on a protest march to express their anger, and several foreign Muslim diplomats in Colombo also raised their concern with the government. Sri Lanka's dependence on the Arab market for tea exports and for employment opportunities for more than one million of its citizens is a compelling reason why the government should be sensitive to anti-Muslim cries at home. Even in the United Nations Sri Lanka carries considerable support from Muslim countries as demonstrated recently over the March 2012 resolution on war crimes. Similarly, the fifty-six member Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) is an international block of Muslim nations whose opinion on Muslim issues carries considerable weight internationally. The umma Islamiyya consciousness of the Sri Lankan Muslims, in spite of its shortcomings, has obvious geo-political implications.
